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In most first year evolution
lectures, including mine, Darwin’s
theory is presented as having
three components: variation within
populations, natural selection and
inheritance. I concentrate on the
causes of natural selection, and
the way in which Mendelian
genetics allows selected traits to
be passed on. As for variation, I
just stick to the observation that
almost all traits have additive
genetic variance in wild
populations, and leave it at that. In
‘The Plausibility of Life: Resolving
Darwin’s Dilemma’ Marc Kirshner
and John Gerhart, cell biologists
working on amphibian
development, invite us to consider
this Cinderella of the three
processes, variation, and to go
beyond the observation that
variation exists to think about how
variation within species and
between groups is created. 
Their central thesis is that
discoveries in the cell and
developmental biology of animals
have shown that the variation that
is produced by mutation is not
random, but, rather, is facilitated
variation. But what do they mean
when they say that variation is
‘facilitated’? They emphatically do
not mean that mutations arise in
response to changed
environments, creating
phenotypes specifically adapted
to the population’s new
circumstances. Still less do they
advocate some intelligent external
force supplying adaptive changes.
What they mean by ‘facilitated’
variation is that animals develop insuch a way that mutational
change, random at the molecular
level, is not random with respect
to its effects on the phenotype,
but, instead, is likely to be such as
to produce a viable and
functioning organism. The
changed phenotype of this new
mutant organism is likely to
reduce its fitness in the present
environment, but is potentially
fitter than that of the current wild-
type organism in a changed
environment. 
Facilitated variation is thus the
process allowing the generation of
viable and fertile new genotypes,
which permit natural selection to
change morphology to track
changing environmental demands.
In making their case, Kirshner and
Gerhart range through some of the
most recent and exciting
discoveries in the comparative
molecular biology of animal
development, including the
remarkable sharing of
homologous genes controlling
corresponding developmental
processes, which can now be
identified as ‘core processes’ that
evolved in the first multicellular
animals. 
The simplistic attitude to
variation that I convey in first year
lectures is not unique to me.
Indeed, there has always been
dismissal of the importance of
sources of variation from many
workers within population biology
and even within population
genetics. In their view,
evolutionary change can simply be
inferred from the demonstration of
the operation of selection on
phenotypically variable
characters. One takes some
measure of fitness, such as
survival or lifetime reproductive
success, and correlates this with a
phenotypic trait. If a significant
correlation is found, the trait is
identified as being subject to
directional selection and, given
that almost all traits in wild
populations show additive genetic
variance, it is assumed that the
trait is evolving towards an
optimal phenotypic value dictated
by the environment. Darwin would
be happy — we have variation, we
have selection and we have
inheritance, and selection drives
phenotypes towardsenvironmentally determined
optima. In fact, many believe that,
as Darwinians, we no longer need
to examine or measure the
evolutionary process itself, we can
simply assume that it does its
stuff. 
In adopting this belief, we move
into a strange hinterland of
evolutionary biology — so
confident that populations will
move to selective optima that
evolutionary biology solely
consists of studying their ecology
to identify these optima. The
message is that selection
operates on traits, and the genes
will always find a way to respond
and give the appropriate
phenotype. I am not alone in
finding this approach woefully
incomplete. In particular, it fails
because it sees the relationship
between trait values and fitness as
an external force — selection
‘acting’ on the population’s
phenotypes — rather than what it
truly is — a correlation between
two phenotypes, each with its own
genetic determination and both
pleiotropically linked by the way in
which the genes make the
phenotype. Kirshner and Gerhart
are absolutely correct in their view
that understanding evolution
requires us to understand
variation, and not merely assume
that it is somehow non-limiting to
evolutionary change.
‘The Plausibility of Life’ is a
stimulating and enjoyable read; it
is very stylishly and clearly written,
and, from my limited knowledge,
appears to be entirely correct in
matters of fact. In some ways it is
a more generally accessible
account of themes the same
authors had described at a more
technical level in their earlier book
‘Cells, Embryos and Evolution:
Toward a Cellular and
Developmental Understanding of
Phenotypic Variation and
Evolutionary Adaptability’. An
underlying idea is that there is so
much sharing of genetic networks
among multicellular animals that,
in order to understand animal
evolution, we have to understand
the ways in which this shared
‘core’ network can be changed to
give adaptive diversity.
This concentration on the
impact of mutation on the
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Wallace Arthur, who in his recent
book ‘Biased Embryos and
Evolution’ explored the idea that
evolution’s direction is influenced
by phenotypic bias in the
mutation process. This
phenotypic bias is not the result
of bias at the molecular level,
such that some base changes are
more probable than others, but
arises because of systematic
heterogeneity in the
consequences of base
substitutions for the phenotype, a
heterogeneity which itself arises
from the nature of embryonic
development. 
Arthur’s theme is that not only
is mutation biased in that not all
phenotypes are equally likely to
be produced by mutation (it is,
after all, inconceivable that
mutation could be unbiased in this
strong sense) but that the
direction that evolution takes is
determined, in an important way,
by this mutational bias. Natural
selection is not the sole
determinant of evolutionary
trajectories. While this theory is
undoubtedly not simply wrong, it
has disturbing corollaries for our
abilities, as biologists, to
understand evolution. If optimal
phenotypes cannot be produced
by evolution because of bias in
the mutational process, how do
we explain phenotype in terms of
adaptation? Predictions made on
the basis of optimality may never
be achieved by a natural selection
process stymied by mutational
bias. 
For Kirschner and Gerhart,
however, the evolutionary world is
more benign. Mutation is biased,
but in a way that specifically tends
to produce the phenotypes that
selection will favour. The central
question is thus what it is about
the discoveries of developmental
biology that predicts that variation
will be ‘facilitated’ in this way. One
is the exploratory behaviour of
cells. Suppose that a mutation
increased the length of limb
bones. Having longer limbs might
well be adaptive. But how can a
change in bone length be
functional, without corresponding
changes being made in the blood
supply, and the muscles and
nerves that move the bones andcontrol these movements? How
could evolution simultaneously
change all these developmental
processes in a coordinated way?
The answer is that cells show
exploratory behaviours —
muscles and nerves grow and
move in quasi-random directions
until they detect the chemical
signals that tell them where to
attach. Blood vessels grow into
tissues in response to a locally
produced signal (vascular
endothelial growth factor). This
means that no additional
mutations are required to ensure
that the blood supply, muscles
and nerves interact appropriately
with the elongated bones. 
Kirshner and Gerhart also argue
that the way in which animals are
built mediates against mutations
having massively pleiotropic
effects. If a mutation has multiple
(pleiotropic) effects, then, even if
one of these increases fitness, the
rest are likely to change other
phenotypic aspects in harmful
ways, and the net result is almost
certain to be deleterious. One
pleiotropy-reducing mechanism
that Kirshner and Gerhart explore
is the compartmentalisation of
animals. The positional
information supplied by selector
genes in early development
creates a kind of invisible
anatomy, and, crucially, this
allows mutations to change one
part of the body without
concomitant effects on other
parts. 
Another property that they note
allows organisms the flexibility to
change is that of ‘weak linkage’:
the network of interacting genes
controlling development is not a
single unified system in which
every part relies on the
simultaneous functioning of all
others; rather, developmental
circuits consist of a series of
evolutionarily conserved sub-
mechanisms, such as signalling
pathways, which are used in
various ways in different parts of
the body. Changes in morphology
can be brought about, not by a
complete reinvention of the whole
network, but through the
utilisation of these conserved sub-
mechanisms in new ways.
We often think of morphological
change being triggered byenvironmental change. But how
can random mutation allow an
organism to find an evolutionary
solution to a changed
environment? Kirshner and
Gerhart correctly regard the
answer to this question as being
related to the fact that all species
already live in a range of
unpredictable environments.
Natural selection has made them
physiologically and
developmentally adaptable to
these differing environments as
they arise. This facilitates
evolutionary adaptation to
systematically changed
environments, not through a
Lamarckian inheritance of
acquired characters, but through
the ease with which mutations
can simply switch to the
constitutive expression of a
physiological state that is among
the range that is already available. 
So, elements in animal
development that favour adaptive
change can be identified. But
there is something that causes me
disquiet here. In describing above
the cogent examples given by
Kirschner and Gerhart of
facilitated mutation, I recalled the
troubling thought I had when
reading the book itself. In
describing the authors’ arguments
for mutation is ‘facilitated’, I have
to illustrate these with
hypothetical alternatives in which
mutation would be less so. But
these are only hypothetical
constructs plucked from the air.
This echoes the general problem
with describing organisms as
showing ‘evolvability’ which is the
appropriate standard of
comparison — evolvable
compared to what? 
Organisms clearly have evolved,
and so we know, a priori, that this
must be possible. But do ‘we’
know this? Unfortunately, not all
of us do. Indeed, in the
background of this work, written
in the USA of the twenty-first
century, is a shadowy straw man
that the authors feel compelled to
rebut. Depressingly often, the
alternative that the authors rule
out is not a view of organisms
coming from other evolutionary
scientists, but a view that exists
only in the imaginations of those
determined to believe that
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intervention from an intelligent
designer. Some of the tone of the
book flows from the authors
regrettably living in a social milieu
where they are forced to
specifically refute claims from
advocates of ‘creation science’
and ‘intelligent design’, rather
than contemptuously ignoring
them as we British tend to do.
I think a possible consequence
of this is that, for Kirshner and
Gerhart, our understanding of the
relationship between animal
development and the
macroevolution of animals seen in
the fossil record is more complete
than I believe it yet can be. It is
almost as if they fear any doubt
and uncertainty will be seized
upon by evolution’s opponents as
a flaw in the whole theory.
Kirshner and Gerhart believe that
multicellular animals have their
capacity for ‘facilitated’ mutation
because of core processes
common to all bilaterian animals,
inherited from the pre-Cambrian
bilaterian ancestor. Core
processes include not just those
such as the operation of the
cytoskeleton and cell division
processes, but also a role of the
Hox genes in antero–posterior
differentiation. Similarly, the first
ancestor can be inferred from
evolutionary conservation to have
had an eye expressing a pax6
orthologue, a heart created by a
nkx2.5 orthologue, dorsal Bmp
expression, myoD determining
muscle, and so on. 
All this is correct and
interesting, but focussing on
genes whose developmental
function is shared across all
animals may give us a biased
picture of how development
actually takes place in any given
organism. As new model genomes
from various phyla are studied, it
is easier to write in an interesting
and articulate way about the
genes whose homologues’ roles
in other phyla are understood. In
doing so we may mislead
ourselves into believing that these
evolutionarily conserved genes
have roles somehow more
fundamental and central in each
new organism than they truly are. 
And while we can identify the
‘core processes’ that had evolvedin the common metazoan
ancestor and have been
maintained since, I do not think
that we know enough to say what
it was about these ‘core’
processes that caused them to be
the ones maintained in all the
descendant lineages, while other
features of the ancestor were
changed. In a kind of gedanken
experiment, we can imagine
ourselves seven hundred million
years ago, with the Bilaterian
ancestor in front of us, and
imagine that we have somehow
forgotten which processes in the
Bilaterian ancestor were actually
retained and which lost. Do we
know enough about development
and evolution to allow us to
predict which of its processes
would not change, and which
would? The implication of the text
is that we could, but I am not
convinced. 
Similarly, I do not share the
authors’ acceptance of the
generally held view that there is a
set of fundamentally differing
‘body plans’ corresponding to
different phyla and, since all the
phyla existed at the Cambrian,
evolution of new body plans had
stopped by that time. I am not
convinced that there was truly the
time-inhomogeneity in evolution
that this implies. I doubt that the
concept of ‘body plan’ is
sufficiently well-defined to allow
us to say in an absolute objective
way that a snail and an octopus,
or a man and an amphioxus, share
body plans, yet a rotifer and a
kinorynch do not. Furthermore, if
we believe that phyla correspond
objectively to differing body plans,
why do we find it so difficult to
decide, on the basis of body
plans, which groups should be in
separate phyla? Onychopherans
move in and out of the Arthropoda
in different classification
schemes. Similarly, Acoels were
thought, on body plan evidence,
to be in the Class Turbellaria, yet
molecular evidence has now
demonstrated that they are not
related to any Platyhelminthes
and should not be in this Phylum. 
What of the central question of
‘evolvability’? Does the facilitated
variation that Kirshner and Gerhart
propose require, for its continued
existence, selection at the specieslevel and above? The traditional
argument here is to suppose that
a species finds itself adapting to a
changed environment — the
successful genotype will be the
one that has the highest fitness in
this new environment. If this
genotype creates high fitness in a
way that compromises its ability
to adapt evolutionarily to further
changed environments in the
future, this will not, in itself,
prevent its spread. Thus, because
present adaptation and future
adaptability are not the same
thing, consistent selection for the
former will erode the latter. How,
then, is evolutionary adaptability
maintained? This has to happen
through a process outwith the
normal canons of population
genetics, specifically through the
loss, through extinction, of
species, genera, families, and so
on, which have fallen behind
others in their evolutionary
adaptability. 
Kirshner and Gerhart, while
including the selection at the
group level that I describe above
as part of the mix that maintains
the capacity for facilitated
variation, also minimise the need
for such selection. As, in their
view, it is the conserved core
processes that create the
capacity for facilitated variation,
each time a facilitated variant is
selected for its contingent
immediate advantage in the
present environment, this will
select also for the core processes
themselves. Present adaptation
and future adaptability may not,
logically, be the same thing, but
the theory of facilitated variation
causes them to be so strongly
correlated that no conflict
between them arises. 
In short, this is a book that I
would recommend strongly to all
interested in evolution of animals,
and the relationship between
development and evolutionary
theory. But it comes with the
caveat that our understanding of
developmental evolution is much
less certain than a reader might
surmise.
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